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POLITICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION IN UKRAINE:  
DYNAMICS AND PERSPECTIVES
Political processes in Ukraine attract significant attention both of the researchers and politicians 
especially after the cancellation of the Association Agreement with EU signing and Euromaidan appearance. 
Numerous political analyses published by Ukrainian and international scholars still remain often within the 
behavioral approach leaving aside the logic and perspectives of the Ukrainian political institutions 
functioning. As the political system in Ukraine is significantly distanced from the society and the political 
processes seemingly proceed mostly inside the polity it would be more convenient to characterize the system 
by the political power distribution models. In the article presented is the retrospective analysis of the 
changes in the structures and procedures of political decision making in Ukraine. It is shown that in making 
political decisions the Ukrainian political system is more and more influenced by external forces – social 
organizations, businesses and the International community with the Russian Federation and the European 
Union as the dominating actors. 
Keywords: models of political power distribution, political monopoly, monopolistic system.
Political power distribution and the models  
of political decision making before 2010
Ukraine attracts significant attention both among 
the politicians and the researchers. Paul D’Anieri [2], 
Taras Kuzio [8], Alexander Motyl [9], Stephen 
Shulman [6] and some other authors devoted their 
publications to the Ukraine’s political system and 
political regimes classification, civil society 
development, democratization processes etc. In these 
and other papers on the topic the comprehensive 
analysis was mostly based on the empirical data and 
contained little theoretical generalization which 
narrowed the analysts’ ability to define driving forces 
and make prognoses on possible outcomes of the 
political processes. One of the main uncertainties was 
expectation of the society reaction on political 
decisions made by the governing bodies. In 2004 no 
one sociological and/or expert prognosis forecasted 
the Orange Revolution. And still remains 
unanswered the question of why prominently 
democratic movements and positive conditions 
created by that Revolution did not result in 
consolidating democracy afterwards.
It seems that the system of political decisions 
making both in Russia and in Ukraine operates without 
taking into account the social needs and expectations 
which to some extend shows rather authoritarian 
character of the regime. From the other side highly 
active opposition and relative freedom of mass-media 
indicate that strong elements of the democracy yet 
exist. It was especially evident in the Parliamentary 
Elections-2012 when the opposition had managed to 
get victory in the proportional part (totally 121 seats of 
225) and in many majority election districts (totally 57 
seats of 2201) [3]. Ivan Krastev in one of his recent 
articles [7] shows a contradictory character of the 
political regime in Russia calling it “Neo-competitive 
Authoritarianism” and argues that its survival in the 
more or less democratic environment is conditioned 
by its non- (or post-) ideological character. Perhaps 
the same conclusion might be made for Ukrainian 
political system. 
For better understanding the political situation 
and the political processes in Ukraine it might be 
more useful to look closer at the system, procedures 
and driving forces in making political decisions 
which strongly depend on the character of the 
political power distribution in the political system. 
Traditionally four models of the distribution are 
considered: Marxism (which is referred in the 
Ukrainian research literature as Monopolism), 
Pluralism, Elitism and (Neo) Corporatism. In my 
previous publications (see, for example, [18]) all the 
models were described theoretically in details. Also 
the general survey of them might be found, for 
example, in [4; 17]. Though the models of political 
power distribution quite well correlate with the basic 
notions of a political regime in practice we may find 
different models within similar regimes. 
The Marxist political power distribution in 
Ukraine was actual over several months before the 
Independence Act in 1991 as the Parliament elected 
in 1990 contained many non- (and anti-) communist 
members. The next period might be defined as 
1 In 5 districts voting results were canceled by the Court 
decision because of a number of violations. Additional voting has 
taken place on 15 December 2013.
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so-called “Pluralism” when at the decision-making 
table about 30 different political groups were present. 
Lack of concordance between the MPs caused signi-
ficant difficulties in the legislature voting for the most 
of political, economic and social issues. The execu-
tive power (initially Council of Ministers, then the 
Cabinet of Ministers) remained actually unchanged 
both personally and structurally/functionally since 
the Soviet times when it dominated in defining all 
national policies. Numerous conflicts between the 
Legislative and the Executive powers led to fast 
worsening of the whole economic and social situa-
tion in the country. Hyperinflation (above 10256 % in 
1993 was reported [5]), structural changes in the 
economy, absence of national currency and many 
other factors were the components of the deep dra-
matic crisis. The policy decisions were mostly made 
by the politicians under the pressure of the Govern-
ment and of the circumstances. It is understandable 
that the bureaucracy had at that time the highest 
power as it possessed many professionals in eco-
nomy and governmental structures, received much 
more detailed information about the social situation 
and possible ways of easing it, was clearly structured 
and disciplined to the opposite of the dissipated and 
amateur legislative political body. That “Pluralistic” 
period ended with the beginning of Leonid Kuchma 
Presidency when he forced the Parliament to sign the 
Constitutional Agreement in 1995 which gave him a 
right and authority to make legislative decisions 
which could become the laws unless the Parliament 
passed a correspondent bill during 30 days after. 
Since that time the Elitist political power distribu-
tion emerged. Its main characteristics were: domina-
tion of the executive power in the policy processes; 
de-politicization and de-ideologization of these pro-
cesses (the Government members did not represent at 
least openly the political parties); prevalence of group 
interests over the social ones; and elite personal devo-
tion to the President much more important for the 
public appointments than professional abilities of the 
candidates. Even the Opposition representatives 
being invited to the Government quickly lost ties 
with their former political parties or groups2. 
The Presidential Election-1999 and the Parlia-
mentary-2002 additionally enforced the Elitist sys-
tem of political power distribution due to the admi-
nistrative resource which had significantly influenced 
pro-Kuchma political parties and blocks victory. But 
the consolidation of the Opposition begun in 2000 
2 Oleksandr Lavrynovych who was one of the top leaders in the 
democratic party Rukh and Ivan Chyzh from the Socialist Party 
shortly after been appointed to the ministerial positions in Kuchma’s 
Government had broken actually and then formally their relations 
with these parties. Later O. Lavrynovych had become the member of 
the Party of Regions. 
with the “Ukraine without Kuchma” campaign cre-
ated the preconditions for the new model of political 
power distribution. 
The Presidential Election and the famous events 
named “The Orange Revolution” in November – 
December 2004 had manifested that the (Neo) Cor-
poratist (see, for example, [1]) system of political 
decisions making emerged. Political power had 
become almost evenly distributed between the 
Orange political forces from one side and the Party of 
Regions together with its left-wing allies – Commu-
nists and Socialists – from the other. Instead of lega-
lizing direct orders like it used to be prepared in the 
executive branch at Kuchma’s times the polity had to 
go through long negotiations on any political deci-
sion. Moreover, after the new Constitution was 
passed in December 2004 the cabinet of Ministers 
appeared to be subordinated mostly to the Parlia-
ment. As a consequence since 2006 the President had 
to lose a significant part of his means of influence on 
the political decision making. 
To keep the authorities in his hands the President 
Viktor Yuschenko began building of the Elitist sys-
tem of governance several months before. First of all 
he had dismissed the then Prime Minister Yulia 
Timoshenko, who was the most independent and 
active player in the political games. The new Cabinet 
of Ministers consisted almost exclusively of Yuschen-
ko’s close friends and even relatives3. Moreover, 
President Yuschenko had kept his strong influence on 
the Nasha Ukraina (Our Ukraine) political party and 
hence – through its fraction in the Parliament – on the 
political processes.
Since that time the Neo-Corporatism was over. 
The whole political process was concentrated in the 
Elite space between the President, the Cabinet of 
Ministers controlled by him due to personal relations, 
and a major group of MPs with the Party of Regions 
as situational allies. The Oranges as the powerful 
political corporation had quickly converted into the 
political “clubs” with restricted membership losing 
their roots at the supporting social groups. 
Unlike Leonid Kuchma, Viktor Yuschenko had 
failed to build a pure elitist system of leadership. 
After the elections-2006, becoming Viktor Yanuko-
vich the Prime Minister and a lot of conflicts and tur-
moil in the Parliament President Yuschenko had 
found reasons to dissolve it and appointed new pre-
term Parliamentary elections. Since that the whole 
process of making political decisions resembled the 
Pluralistic Era when the only effectively acting poli-
tical institution was the Executive branch: 
3 There was an expression for these people: “Liubi druzi” – 
“Darling Friends”. 
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•  the Parliament was almost evenly divided 
between the ruling coalition and the Opposition 
under the Party of Regions domination (the 
majority had advantage in only a few votes 
which often was insufficient to make decisions); 
•  the President could veto the Parliament’s 
decisions but the Cabinet of Ministers was 
keeping relative independence; 
•  the Constitutional Court also was divided and 
hence incapable to make any decisions. 
In these circumstances the Cabinet’s decisions 
often became rather political than executive or 
administrative actor. Signing by Yulia Timoshenko in 
January 2009 the Agreement which ended the Gas 
War with Russia was the bright example of such 
mode of making decisions. 
In 2007–2009 we may see the mixture of at least 
the three models of political power distribution:
1.  Pluralistic model when the balance of political 
powers in the Parliament existed with a few 
small actors voting occasionally and by the 
principle of “sticks and carrots”. The only 
institution possessed real power – the Cabinet 
of Ministers which worked often in the absence 
of legal basis trying to solve or at least ease 
social and economic problems4. 
2.  Elitist model with a very narrow circle of 
people sitting at the making decisions table. 
Again it may be considered as the absence of 
politics in its democratic sense: the horizontal 
components of the political process – both 
internal and foreign political, economic and 
social institutions were excluded from the 
policy making processes. 
3.  Neo-Corporatist model however strange it 
would look like. Both major political forces/
corporations – Bat’kivschyna led by Yulia 
Timoshenko and Party of Regions led by 
Viktor Yanukovich consolidated a significant 
number of partisans in different parts of 
Ukraine. It gave them a social basis which 
later had played a very significant role in the 
President’s election 2009–2010. 
Political monopoly since 2010
Though the Presidential Election-2009–20105 
was recognized by the international observers as 
democratic the administrative resource had yet 
played its negative role. Viktor Yanukovich received 
4 In this way the Timoshenko’s Cabinet had managed more or 
less successfully to moderate the 2008–2009 financial crisis 
influence on Ukrainian economy. 
5 The Election lasted from the middle of December 2009 till 
end of January 2010. The last voting happened on February 7, 2010. 
48,95 % of the votes and Yulia Timoshenko – 
45,47 % [13]. Pretty soon after Yanukovich had 
come into the Office the whole system of political 
decisions making converted into almost pure 
Marxist/Monopolistic model. 
Immediately after the Election–2010 results were 
published the Parliament created the vast majority of 
pro-Presidential MP: the Party of Regions fraction 
had bought (in a direct sense) or convinced to join 
them in another ways about 50 representatives from 
other fractions (these people were called “tushki” – 
chicken bodies). Having a majority of 250–270 votes 
the Parliament soon made very important changes 
first of all in the Constitutional Court to get pro-
Presidential majority in this political institute too. 
The Timoshenko’s Cabinet of Ministers resigned in a 
month after the Election, and the new Prime Minister 
Mykola Azarov had hired most exclusively Party of 
Regions members to the ministerial positions. Since 
spring 2010 all the political decisions were prepared 
at the President’s Administration and passed by the 
Parliament without any serious discussions. The last 
movement towards the Monopoly was on the 
September 30 when the Constitutional Court 
“domesticated” by the President decided that the 
Constitution changes made in December 2004 were 
illegal because of some procedural violations. The 
Parliament without any discussions had approved 
this decision. 
In this way all other actors were excluded from 
the making decisions process. By the logic of the 
Monopolist/Marxist model the economy issues 
appeared on the top of priorities. But unlike the 
classical model when according to Karl Marx the 
ruling class takes everything under its control here 
we saw the process of concentrating maximum of 
the economy in the hands of a few oligarchs close to 
the President and the Party of Regions. The new 
Taxation Code passed through the Parliament 
without any discussions for about 10 minutes had 
made small and medium business unprofitable. As a 
consequence more than 1 million of private 
businesses were shut down in several weeks. 
In December 2010 a new Maidan6 exploded in 
Kyiv and several other cities. This time it consisted 
mostly from the private entrepreneurs trying to 
defend their businesses from death. The oppositional 
political parties tried to bring some political spirit to 
it but the organizers refused. The power of this 
Maidan was so strong that in a short time the 
Parliament made amendments to the Taxation Code 
which eased the tax burden on these businesses. 
6 By the analogy with the Maidan (Square in Ukrainian) in the 
2004 Orange Revolution when from 400 000 to 1 000 000 people 
were standing on the central square of Kyiv). 
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The Monopolist system was further enforces by 
the appointments of regional and local governors in 
all the regions of Ukraine. These people as well as the 
heads of regional Police departments, prosecutors, 
even judges – mostly were not only the members of 
the Party of Regions but their origin was Donbass 
area. In this way the President intended to create the 
whole administrative rigid vertical structure staffed 
with the persons from his close physical surrounding. 
Before the Parliamentary Election-2012 all the 
legislative, executive and judicial power was in 
hands of one political force – Party of Regions. The 
political and executive decisions were previously 
prepared at the President’s Administration. It was 
expected quite logically that the Election-2012 
would be won by the ruling party due to the 
administrative resources and different means to 
suppress the Opposition and to change voluntarily 
the results of voting. 
Fail and survival of the monopolist system 
Despite the efforts of the ruling party it failed to 
win the Election-2012 and to get the Constitutional 
majority in the Parliament as it received only 30 % of 
the votes (72 seats in the Parliament) getting less than 
a half of seats in the proportional part of the Elections. 
The three oppositional parties (Bat’kivschyna, UDAR 
and Svoboda) got 121 seats. Together with the results 
of voting in the one-mandate electoral districts the 
Party of Regions got 184 seats and even with its allies 
from the Communist Party (13,18 % – 32 seats) did 
not create the direct majority. At the same time the 
opposition had won additional 57 seats in the one-
mandate districts and also could not get a majority. 
In such circumstances the only hope of the ruling 
party was with the self-nominated candidates 
(42 seats) many of which did not show openly their 
ties with the Party of Regions. Indeed, several months 
later almost all these MPs joined the ruling party and 
it again received a majority. But just the first sessions 
of the new Parliament had shown absence of the con-
cordance inside the majority – several votes for the 
bills suggested by the President and the Cabinet of 
Ministers were banned mostly by this fraction. Such 
a disagreement manifested actually end of the 
Monopolist system. 
This conclusion was further confirmed in case of 
the European Integration Plan implementation: the 
Parliament banned one bill by another. The whole 
process of political decisions making became less 
and less transparent as it was difficult to discover 
which instructions were sent by the President and 
his Administration to their MPs and to the Cabinet 
of Ministers. 
Political power: too much or not enough? 
As the situation with many issues of political 
processes both inside Ukraine and in its relations 
with the outer World becomes more and more 
unstable and hence uncertain it is worthwhile to 
discuss the driving forces, reasons and perspectives 
before, now and ahead. 
First of all, describing the system of making 
poli tical decisions we have shown that it was 
restricted mostly by the actors sitting directly at 
the decisions table. The social forces – move-
ments, oppositional parties and organizations, 
NGOs – all were actually distanced from the pro-
cesses. Nevertheless, as the decisions changed 
norms of social behavior to the directions less 
favorable to many groups of the  society these 
groups began to express more and more often 
their disappointment: in 2012 number of social 
protests had grown by 60 % compared to 2011 – 
to 3636 events of all-Ukrainian and regional 
scale. The Center of the Society Studies in his 
report published in 2013 indicated that 43 % were 
related with the socioeconomic issues whereas 
the political and ideological issues were the rea-
sons for the protests in 58 % of cases and 17 % of 
the events were for the human and civil rights 
[12]. This activity was not taken into account by 
the ruling forces in the most cases except a few 
ones when the decisions causing strong protests 
were changed or abandoned. 
Business was another actor external to the 
official processes of making decisions which 
also has played its significant role. We need to 
consider at least two groups of businesses. The 
first group are the oligarchs with the assets of 
over $48 billion [16]. For a long time these peo-
ple tried to realize their interests by direct per-
sonal participation in the political processes 
through the membership in the Parliament. But 
in the Election-2012 there were actually no oli-
garchs in the candidates lists of poli tical parties. 
The reasons might be different and the answer 
requires additional studies. Concerning the 
influence of this group on the political processes 
we may suggest that the recent turn of the For-
eign  Policy vector from Russia towards the 
European Union is strictly caused by the pres-
sure of this group. 
Another group is represented by the small and 
medium private businesses. Their influence on the 
political/policy processes is much less evident 
except the Maidan-2 which was mentioned above. 
Also it might be concluded from the social protest 
analyses that this group is on the Stand-by position 
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ready to react on any repressions both of economic 
and of political character.7
And the last (but not the least) powerful actor is 
the International community represented by the 
Russian Federation from one side and the European 
Union together with other Western countries (first of 
all The United States) from the other. The European 
Integration process in Ukraine was boosted mostly 
by the European political institutions at the end of 
2012 which was negatively accepted by Russia. In 
the Summer and Autumn 2013 Ukraine experienced 
“stick” from the RF and “carrot” from the EU: 
•  economic blockade of the Ukrainian foods 
import to Russia;
•  political threats to put obstacles for the people 
mobility between the two countries;
•  threats to begin a new “Gas War”;
•  opening European markets for the Ukrainian 
goods; 
•  easing the visa regime for the Ukrainian citi-
zens travel to Europe;
•  suggesting some financial and economic pre-
ferences for the Ukraine economy.
But n the mid-December 2013 the roles of these 
two actors had reversed: the EU declared its readi-
ness for sanctions against the ruling elite and Russia 
offered money for the support of Ukrainian economy. 
Conclusions
If we compare the dynamics of both the political 
regime and the system of political decisions making 
in Ukraine and, specifically, its Northern neighbor 
Belarus, we may conclude that monopolistic political 
power in the latter strictly corresponds to the 
authoritarian regime characteristics [17]. The authors 
mentioned above [2; 8; 9] all stressed the authoritarian 
character of Ukrainian polity but presented here 
analysis of the political power distribution and 
correspondingly the system of political decisions 
making proves strong arguments on instability of the 
regime and the system. It is not sufficient for a 
political power to get monopoly in political decisions 
making to dominate in the State so long as in Belarus. 
Economic and social efficiency of the Pluralistic 
model appeared to be quite low in case of Ukraine 
which was proved by the extremely serious crisis in 
1991–1995. Then building the Elitist model by 
Leonid Kuchma helped to stop it and to recover the 
economy in 1995–2001. We may suggest that is was 
due to the system capability to make urgent decisions 
7 This article was written before the events of December 2013 
which has shown tremendous support of Maidan from the small and 
medium businesses. In average the financial and goods support is 
about 400.000 hryvna ($50.000) daily.
for reacting on the economic and social challenges. 
Neo-Corporatist period in 2004–2006 also showed 
ability of the system to provide economic and social 
growth. Then the attempts of Viktor Yuschenko to 
re-establish Elitist model led Ukraine to stagnation 
and recession in 2007–2009. Slow economic 
recovery in the second half of 2009 was actually due 
to the Timoshenko’s government actions as neither 
President nor the Parliament were eager to assist. 
After the political turmoil period the establish-
ment by Viktor Yanukovich of a simple and solid 
Monopolist system of decision making was expected 
to bring a new socioeconomic rise. Instead Ukrainian 
economy has shown even more serious recession 
than in previous 2007–2009 period. Even official 
data of the Ministry of Finances8 showed +7,0 % of 
GDP in 2012 compared with 32,5 % in 2007 and 
31,5 % in 2008 [4]. At the same time the independent 
experts indicate that in 2012 actual rise of GDP was 
only 0,2 % [15]. Together with falling down another 
index – industrial production – it says about improper 
functioning of all the governance system and perhaps 
first of all – the system of making political decisions. 
Together with the mass-media and experts’ 
messages about gaining wealth of the President’s 
Family and his closest friends the facts shown here 
point out on pursuing rather private interests in 
making political decisions than the national ones. 
This may explain numerous appointments of 
professionally margin individuals to administrative 
positions both in the Center and in the regions. 
The article would not be finished without 
considering the future perspectives of monopolistic 
system. Unlike political and administrative 
monopoly of the Communist Party in the USSR the 
current system experiences lack of any ideology 
which would help to mobilize citizens and to 
“substitute” deficit of economic wellness. According 
to the recent sociological pools the ruling party’s 
support falls down even in the Donbass region. One 
of the sociological institutions Research and 
Branding Group has published the sociological 
results which had shown that in September 2013 the 
Party of Region support was 22 % (in the 
Election-2012 this party received 30 % of votes) 
and the President Yanukovich would get 20,8 % 
compared to 48,95 % in 2010 [14]. 
Leonid Kuchma’s attempts to establish a political 
monopoly in 1999-2004 failed due to the Orange 
Revolution but the beginning of the end was in 2000 
with the Movement “Ukraine without Kuchma” in 
which more than a million people took part. The 
8 The word “even” is used because the official data of Ukrainian 
government during last several years appeared not to reflect real 
situation in economy. 
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Yanukovich’s monopolistic system has no public 
support. Hence it might be expected that it will 
dissipate even before the Presidential Election-2015. 
The logic of the political decision making system 
dynamics we may expect return to the Pluralism but 
with much less actors. The Belarussian scenario will 
hardly be implemented keeping in mind rising 
strength of the opposing political forces and the 
public protests potential. 
The last minute comments
This article was written in September – October 
2013. But while it was under final editing the events 
in Ukraine have proved the main conclusions – 
Marxist system is incapable to survive long. In my 
next studies I’ll try to discuss specificity of this 
model in the modern society and to explain logic of 
its creation and collapse.
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Дем’янчук О. П.
поділ політичНої Влади В уКРаїНі: диНаМіКа і пеРспеКтиВи
Політичні процеси в Україні привертають значну увагу як дослідників, так і політиків, особливо 
після скасування підписання Угоди про асоціацію з ЄС та появи Євромайдану. Численні публікації 
українських та зарубіжних учених відбуваються в межах поведінкового підходу, залишаючи 
осторонь логіку та перспективи функціонування українських політичних інститутів. Оскільки 
політична система в Україні значно дистанціювалася від суспільства, а політичні процеси 
відбуваються всередині державних інститутів, було б зручніше характеризувати політичну 
систему через політичні моделі розподілу влади. У статті представлено ретроспективний аналіз 
змін у структурах і процедурах ухвалення політичних рішень в Україні. Показано, що при ухваленні 
політичних рішень українська політична система все більше залежить від зовнішніх сил – 
громадських організацій, бізнесу та міжнародних відносин з Російською Федерацією та 
Європейським Союзом як домінуючих акторів.
Ключові слова: моделі політичного розподілу влади, політична монополія, монополістична 
система.
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